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REVIEWING THE MAGIC PIPES: ANGELEX LTD. v. UNITED
STATES, OILY WATER SEPARATORS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW OF COAST GUARD ACTION
Benjamin Abel*
INTRODUCTION
In April, 2013, the M/V Antonis G. Pappadakis arrived in port in Norfolk,
Virginia.1 While conducting a Port State Inspection of the vessel, the United States
Coast Guard collected evidence suggesting that the Pappadakis crew employed a
magic pipe.2 A magic pipe allows a vessel to bypass its oily water separator and
pump contaminated waste water directly over the side, in violation of international
treaty and United States law.3
Having concluded that the Pappadakis crew had used a magic pipe, the Coast
Guard requested that United States Customs and Border Patrol put a hold on the
vessel, effectively detaining the Pappadakis in place.4 The Pappadakis owner paid
for the costs associated with keeping the Pappadakis at the dock out-of-pocket.5
Having failed to come to a bond agreement to secure the release of the vessel, the
Pappadakis owner brought an emergency action in the Eastern District of Virginia,
Norfolk Division to compel the Coast Guard to come to a bond agreement with the
owners.6 The district court held that the Coast Guard had abused its discretion by
charging an unreasonable bond amount, and that the Coast Guard violated the
Pappadakis owners due process rights.7 The district court also ruled that it held
admiralty jurisdiction over the proceeding.8
* J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 2015; B.A., University of Virginia, 2010. I would
like to thank a number of individuals for their assistance and guidance in the writing of this
Note. Thank you to Patrick Brogan, David Sump, and Christopher Abel for helping me find this
topic and develop my thesis. Professors Allison Orr Larsen, Angela Banks, Christopher Griffin,
Jr., Michael Steven Green, and Mason Lowe provided invaluable help along the way. Thank
you to Brett Piersma, my Note Editor, for his insight and his patience. Finally, thank you to
Emily Strider for her ongoing support. Any errors are mine alone.
1 See infra Part I.
2 See infra Part I.
3 See infra Part III.
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra Part IV.
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Parts IV, VI.
8 See infra Part VI.
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In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
district court held no jurisdiction over the Coast Guards actions.9 The Fourth Circuit
held that the district court did not possess admiralty jurisdiction over the controversy
and that the Coast Guards actions were unreviewable by the district court.10 Finally,
the Fourth Circuit held that the owners constitutional claims did not provide the courts
with jurisdiction.11
This Paper argues that the courts should have jurisdiction to review the vessels
owners constitutional claims.12 After providing background, the Paper first argues
that both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have held there to be jurisdiction
overconstitutional questions regardingagencyaction even when the action isunreview-
able on other grounds.13 Next, this Paper argues that the constitutional argument was
properly raised by the vessels owner.14 The Paper then argues a potentially trou-
bling court split has developed over constitutional review of Coast Guard action in
this area.15 Finally, this Paper argues that constitutional review of Coast Guard action
is needed given how quickly the Coast Guard brings magic pipe enforcement actions
and the increasing worry that whistle-blowers will fabricate information.16 This Paper
does not discuss in detail the Fourth Circuits holdings on the Coast Guards alleged
abuse of discretion nor its possession of jurisdiction over an admiralty claim.
I. BACKGROUND OF ANGELEX LTD. V. UNITED STATES
On April 14, 2013, the M/V Antonis G. Pappadakis, a Greek-flagged ocean-going
bulk cargo carrier, arrived in port in Norfolk, Virginia.17 The Pappadakis was owned
by Angelex Ltd. and operated by Kassian Maritime, Ltd., a Greek company.18 Impor-
tantly, the Pappadakis was Angelexs only income-earning asset.19 That day, the
9 See infra Part VI.
10 See infra Part IV.
11 See infra Part VI.
12 See infra Part V.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part VI.
15 See infra Part VIII.
16 See infra Part IX.
17 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, No. 2:13cv237, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at *4 (E.D.
Va. May8, 2013); see also Robert McCabe, Federal Indictments Handed Down in Coal-Ship
Case, THE VIRGINIAN PILOT (May 24, 2013), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/05/federal
-indictments-handed-down-coalship-case; Mark M. Murakami, Coast GuardYou Want
Your Boat Back? We Set Bond AmountAngelex v. US, HAWAIIOCEANLAW.COM (July 25,
2013), http://www.hawaiioceanlaw.com/hawaiioceanlaw/2013/07/coast-guard-you-want
-your-boat-back-we-set-bond-amount-angelex-v-us.html; Michael Welles Shapiro, Judge to
Ship Owner, Coast Guard: Compromise, DAILYPRESS (May6, 2013), http://articles.dailypress
.com/2013-05-06/business/dp-nws-ports-coal-ship-detention-0507-20130506_1_coast-guard
-ship-oily-bilge-water.
18 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 2013).
19 Id.
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Pappadakis took on a load of coal at the Norfolk Southern Terminal in Norfolk that
was scheduled for delivery to a Brazilian customer.20 The next day, the United States
Coast Guard boarded the Pappadakis to conduct a Port State Control Inspection of
the vessel, a routine vessel inspection.21
During the Coast Guards inspection, one of the Pappadakis crew members passed
a note to an inspector stating that the Pappadakis oily water separator had been by-
passed and that the Pappadakis had been pumping contaminated bilge water over-
board.22 Knowingly bypassing a vessels oily water separator constitutes a violation of
international treaty and is a Federal Class D felony.23 The Coast Guard inspectors
investigated further and found the Pappadakis oily water separator inoperable, as well
as other evidence suggesting the possible discharge of oily bilge water overboard.24
The crew member also showed the inspector the Pappadakis oily water separators
pumps and hoses, which the inspector seized.25
The crew members note also claimed that the Pappadakis crew had not recorded
the discharges overboard in the vessels Oil Record Book.26 Foreign-flagged vessels
over a certain tonnage are required to maintain an Oil Record Book, which allows
the Coast Guard to monitor and prevent pollution from oil discharges.27 Improperly
maintaining a vessels Oil Record Book is a violation of the Act to Prevent Pollution
from Ships.28 An inspection of the Pappadakis Oil Record Book allegedly revealed
significant discrepancies in the amounts of oily bilge mixtures produced and the
amounts contained in the bilge water holding tanks, suggesting that the oil record book
was incomplete or falsified.29 Taking all of this information together, the Coast Guard
delivered to the Pappadakis port agent a letter on April 19, 2013 stating that the
Coast Guard requested that the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency
withhold clearance of the Pappadakis departure.30 The Coast Guard also sent its
findings to the Department of Justice for review and possible prosecution.31
20 Id.
21 Id. During a Port State Control Inspection, the Coast Guard verif[ies] that foreign vessels
are complying with conventions governing safety, pollution, cargo, and labor. United States
v. Taohim, No. 12-14316, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15437, at *3 (11th Cir. July 30, 2013).
22 Angelex, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at *45.
23 Id. at *3.
24 Id. at *6.
25 Id.
26 Angelex, 723 F.3d at 503.
27 United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2008).
28 See 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(a) (2013) (Each oil tanker of 150 gross tons and above, ship of
400 gross tons and above other than an oil tanker, and manned fixed or floating drilling rig or
other platform shall maintain an Oil Record Book Part I (Machinery Space Operations). An oil
tanker of 150 gross tons and above or a non oil tanker that carries 200 cubic meters or more
of oil in bulk, shall also maintain an Oil Record Book Part II (Cargo/Ballast Operations).).
29 Angelex, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at *6.
30 Id. The Coast Guard may make such requests pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1908(e) (2012).
31 Angelex, 723 F.3d at 503.
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The Coast Guard and the attorneys for the Pappadakis owner, Angelex, subse-
quently began negotiating a security agreement that would allow the Pappadakis to
leave Norfolk.32 Initially, the Coast Guard demanded $3 million in a security bond
from Angelex.33 Following a counter-offer from Angelex, the Coast Guard reduced
its demand to $2.5 million.34 Angelex again countered, offering to either post $750,000
in a cash bond or $1.5 million in a surety bond.35 $750,000 constituted almost all of
Angelexs available cash-on-hand.36
Not only did the Coast Guard propose $2.5 million in security, but it also required
Angelex to comply with a number of drastic, non-monetary concessions.37 Specifi-
cally, the Coast Guards proposal required that Angelex:
(1) make the Pappadakis crewmembers and other employees avail-
able for legal proceedings, including travel arrangements to facili-
tate court appearances and meetings with counsel or with law
enforcement; (2) encourage the crewmembers to cooperate with
investigators; (3) refrain from taking disciplinary or other adverse
action against crewmembers who cooperate; (4) prevent certain
material witnesses from leaving with the vessel; (5) take custody
of these material witnesses passports for safekeeping and notify
counsel for the government if requested to return them; (6) stipu-
late to certain incontrovertible facts, such as ownership and opera-
tion of the vessel and authenticity of documents and other items
taken from the ship; (7) authorize counsel to accept service of cor-
respondence and legal papers; (8) enter an appearance in federal
district court to answer anycriminal charges that are filed; (9) assist
in effecting service of process on foreign crewmembers; and
(10) return crewmembers to their home countries when their pres-
ence in the United States is no longer needed for anticipated crim-
inal proceedings.38
Angelex objected to the Coast Guards demands on a number of grounds and, on
April 25, 2013, filed an emergency petition in the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk
Division.39 On May 6, 2013, Senior Judge Robert Doumar held a hearing on Angelexs
32 Angelex, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at *6.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at *67.
36 Id. at *6.
37 Id. at *68.
38 Id. at *78.
39 Id. at *89.
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petition.40 During the hearing, Judge Doumar recessed in the hopes that the Coast
Guard and Angelex could work out an agreement.41 During that time, the parties ap-
parently did come to an agreement, wherein Angelex would deposit $1.5 million in
bond and agree to other non-monetary obligations.42 However, the deal was condi-
tioned on approval by Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C.43 When Judge
Doumar reconvened the hearing, the Coast Guards counsel informed the Court that
Coast Guard headquarters rejected the proposed deal and that the Coast Guard firmly
refuse[d] to accept less than the $2.5 million bond it had previously offered. That was
that, and nothing else was acceptable.44
II. MARPOL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Maritime pollution is governed internationally through a series of international
treaties and regimes.45 The most important of these is the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution (MARPOL).46 International maritime pollution was
first seriously discussed at 1972s Stockholm Conference on the Human Environ-
ment.47 The first MARPOL Convention occurred in 1973 and the second occurred
in 1978,48 resulting in a combined protocol known as MARPOL 73/78.49 MARPOL
is divided into five annexes, and the first two became compulsory with the conven-
tions ratification.50 The first, Annex I, deals with the regulation of oil pollution, and
the second, Annex II, governs noxious liquid substances.51 The International Maritime
Organization (IMO), an agency of the United Nations, is responsible for MARPOLs




44 Id. at *10. It is clear from Judge Doumars opinion that the court was incredibly dis-
pleased with Coast Guard headquarters refusal of the proposed deal. See id. at *910. Judge
Doumar apparently demanded from the Coast Guards present counsel the name of the Coast
Guard officer who refused the deal at headquarters, and it took the prodding of the Court,
and . . . some recesses for the Coast Guards counsel to identify the individual who refused the
deal. Id. In fact, Judge Doumar goes so far as to name the individual in his opinion: Captain
Melissa Bert, Chief of the Maritime and International Law Division. Id. at *9.
45 See Emeka Duruigbo, Reforming the International Law and Policy on Marine Oil
Pollution, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 68 (2000).
46 Eric B. Rothenberg & Robert S. Nicksin, Recent Development, Latest Developments
in International Maritime Environmental Regulation, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 137, 138 (2008).
47 History of MARPOL, INTL MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/Refer
encesAndArchives/HistoryofMARPOL/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
48 Id.
49 Duruigbo, supra note 45, at 70.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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administration.52 IMO is comprised of representatives from 152 nations, including the
United States.53 Ratifying nations are responsible for enforcing MARPOL.54
In the United States, MARPOL is enforced through the Act to Prevent Pollution
from Ships (APPS).55 Congresspassed theAPPS following its ratification of MARPOL
on July 2, 1980.56 The APPS applies to all U.S.-flagged ships anywhere in the world
and to all foreign-flagged vessels operating in [the] navigable waters of the United
States or while at port under U.S. jurisdiction.57 The APPS assigns enforcement of
MARPOLs Annex I to the United States Coast Guard,58 and violations of the APPS
can result in either civil or criminal penalties.59 Not only can such penalties be enforced
against the violating vessels owner in personam, but penalties can also be enforced
against the vessel itself in rem.60 The Coast Guard can enforce the APPS in any United
States judicial district where the ship may be found.61
The APPS gives the Coast Guard a number of powers in investigating possible
MARPOL violations. These powers include: (1) the ability to detain or revoke clear-
ance of a vessel not in compliance, (2) the ability to request that the United States Cus-
toms and Border Protection detain a foreign-flagged vessel not in compliance, and
(3) the ability to release a previously detained vessel who has filed a satisfactory bond
or other surety.62
In recent years, the Coast Guard has stepped up its pursuit of vessels violating
the APPS.63 Because of this increased enforcement, as well as heightened security
after the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard has undertaken a com-
prehensive program of boarding foreign flag-state vessels calling U.S. ports.64 The
increased scrutiny has resulted in a rash of vessel and crew detentions, as well as
52 Rothenberg & Nicksin, supra note 46, at 138.
53 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32450, CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION:
BACKGROUND, LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND KEY ISSUES 7 (2008).
54 Rothenberg & Nicksin, supra note 46, at 138.
55 33 U.S.C. §§ 190115 (2012).
56 MarjorieA.Shields, Annotation, Construction and ApplicationofAct toPrevent Pollution
from Ships (APPS), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901 et seq., 38 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 565, 572 (2009).
57 COPELAND, supra note 53, at 8.
58 Rothenberg & Nicksin, supra note 46, at 139.
59 Shields, supra note 56, at 574.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Benedict S. Gullo, The Illegal Discharge of Oil on the High Seas: The U.S. Coast Guards
Ongoing Battle Against Vessel Polluters and a New Approach Toward Establishing Environ-
mental Compliance, 209 MIL. L. REV. 122, 142 (2011).
63 Robert B. Parrish et al., Criminalization of Maritime Casualties Circa 2013, 87 TUL.
L. REV. 995, 1009 (2013).
64 Id. (quoting U.S. Authorities Investigation and Prosecution of Alleged By-Passing of Oily
Water Separation Systems, CHALOSOCONNOR,LLP, 1, http://codus-law.com/pdf/us-authorities
-investigate-prosecution.pdf).
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criminal allegations and charges against vessel owners, operators, managers, officers,
and crews.65
Administrative action is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).66
Adopted in 1946, the APA is the most important federal statute of general applica-
bility to modern administrative agencies.67 Under the APA, agency action is subject
to judicial review.68 There are two important exceptions to the APAs general defer-
ence to judicial review: when a statute precludes judicial review or when agency
action is committed to the agencys discretion by law.69
III. OILY WATER SEPARATORS AND MAGIC PIPES
Ships are like floating bath tubs. As a vessel operates at sea, water collects in the
bottom of the ship and has nowhere to go. There, the water mixes with oil, dirt, sludge,
and other pollutants that have similarly settled in the bottom of the vessel. This oily
water mix is typically stored in bilge water holding tanks in the vessel until the crew
can dispose of the mix.70
One way of disposing of the oily water mix consists of using an oily water separa-
tor onboard the vessel. An oily water separator is self-describing and is designed
to separate the waste oil from the water. If maintained and used properly, the Oil
Water Separator discharges clean bilge water overboard and retains the separated
oily water and sludge on board for burning in the ships incinerator or for disposal
on shore . . . .71 Although technically complicated, the oily water separator, ideally, al-
lows bilge water to be pumped overboard at MARPOL-compliant pollution levels.72
Oily water separators themselves are expensive, but not prohibitively expensive
for many vessels to have.73 Maintenance, repair, cleaning, and crew training add to
these costs for a vessel owner employing an oily water separator.74 Adding to these
65 Id. at 100910.
66 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
67 STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.01(3) (2014).
68 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
69 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
70 Gullo, supra note 62, at 128.
71 R. Michael Underhill, Dumping Oil, Cooking the Books, and Telling Lies: The False
Statements Act as Applied to Marine Pollution, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 271, 276 (200203).
72 For a detailed description of the specifications of an oily water separator and how one
works, see Gullo, supra note 62, at 130.
73 Id. at 131 ([N]ew and larger vessels can easily cost over $100 million to build . . . .
A new [oily water separator] ranges from $10,000 to $100,000, depending on the complexity
of the model purchased and whether it has the capacity to self-clean.).
74 Id. ([C]apital, maintenance, and repair costs for an [oily water separator] quickly add
up. . . . Additionally, the cost of training crew members to operate an [oily water separator]
system ranges from $3,000 to $5,000 per year. Finally, [oily water separator] maintenance
costs, to include periodic checks, washings, and filter replacements, fall between $3,000 to
$15,000 per year. (footnote omitted)).
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monetary costs are the manpower costs associated with running and maintaining an
oily water separator. Operation of an oilywater separator generally requires at least one
crew member during an eight-hour watch,75 and more crew members for rigorous
maintenance of the oily water separator.76
Because of these costs, the crews of vessels often seek to bypass the oily water
separator so as to pump their oily water mix directly overboard. One way to bypass
the oily water separator is with a magic pipe.77 The magic pipe is simply a hose
fitted to the oily water separator system that allows for the oily water mix from the
bilge to bypass the oily water separator and be pumped straight overboard.78 Magic
pipes are typically designed to be easily installed at sea, then uninstalled and concealed
when approaching port,79 and [t]he use of a [magic] pipe is normally accompanied
by a falsification of the MARPOL-required oil record book,80 a violation of the APPS
in its own right that compounds a vessel owners potential liability.81 More sophisti-
cated crews build a more permanent magic pipe that appears to be a part of the actual
oily water separator itself.82
IV. ANGELEX AND ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In his emergency order, Judge Doumar conceded that the APPS does commit
decision-making to agencydiscretion.83 Even still, Judge Doumarcontends, agencydis-
cretion is reviewable if that discretion is abused by the agency.84 According to Judge
Doumars opinion, the Coast Guard did abuse that discretion in this instance in two
ways.85 First, Judge Doumar held that the Coast Guards requirements included non-
monetary obligations not designed to ensure the easier payment of any fines, but rather
to make the Coast Guards potential prosecution of the Pappadakis and Angelex
75 Id.
76 Underhill, supra note 71, at 276.
77 AndrewW. Homer,Comment, RedSky at Morning: The Horizon forCorporations, Crew
Members, and CorporateOfficersas theUnited StatesContinuesAggressive Criminal Prosecu-
tion of Intentional Pollution from Ships, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 149, 151 (2007).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Parrish et al., supra note 63, at 1009.
81 Id.
82 Gullo, supra note 62, at 135.
83 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, No. 2:13cv237, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at
*1920 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2013) (Section 1908(e) commits to the discretion of the Secretary
of Homeland Security the determination of whether a bond or other surety offered as a
condition for obtaining departure clearance is satisfactory. . . . She, in turn, appears to have
delegated this discretionaryauthority to theCoast Guard, a component agencyof the Department
of Homeland Security. (citation omitted)).
84 Id. at *20.
85 Id. at *2428.
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easier.86 Such demands are not within the statutorily granted discretion to condition
a vessels departure clearance on the filing of a bond or other surety for the purpose
of assuring payment of any fine or civil penalty that might be incurred by the vessel
[in rem] upon the completion of criminal or civil proceedings.87 The Coast Guards
requirement that certain crew members of the Pappadakis remain in the Eastern
District of Virginia held no relation to the payment of a civil penalty.88
More importantlytoJudgeDoumar, the Coast Guard abused its discretion in setting
an unreasonable bond.89 In deciding that the Coast Guard set unreasonable bond, Judge
Doumar held that [t]he record before the Court includes persuasive evidence that
a $2.5 million bondor fine for that matteris simply beyond the financial where-
withal of the petitioners, and that the continued detention of the vessel by withholding
its departure clearance will rapidly bankrupt the vessels owner.90 And, Judge Doumar
noted that under the sentencing guidelines, any fine that might be imposed upon con-
viction in the anticipated criminal proceeding would be limited so as to avoid sub-
stantially jeopardizing the continued viability of the organization.91 Since the Court
could not impose a fine that would potentially ruin Angelex, Judge Doumar reasoned
that the imposition of a bond that did the same would be an abuse of discretion.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Judge Doumar, ruling that the Coast Guard did
not abuse the discretion given to it under the APPS.92 First, the Fourth Circuit noted
that it had previously held that decisions committed to absolute agency discretion
are still reviewable in limited circumstances.93 In this instance, though, the Coast Guard
did not overstep its bounds. First, the Fourth Circuit held that [Angelex] cannot with
a straight face argue that the Coast Guard has acted outside the bounds of [the APPS].
Indeed, those bounds are quite limitless. The Coast Guard may demand a low bond,
a high bond, or may refuse to grant clearance altogether.94 In making this determi-
nation, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the APPSs language that clearance
may be granted by the Secretary.95
The Fourth Circuit also held that the APPS held a protection against abuses of
discretion by the Coast Guard in such instances. [The] APPS contains a built-in
86 Id. at *24.
87 Id. at *23.
88 See id. at *24.
89 Id. at *2428.
90 Id. at *26.
91 Id.
92 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2013).
93 Id. ([E]ven where action is committed to absolute agency discretion by law, courts have
assumed the power to review allegations that an agency exceeded its legal authority, acted un-
constitutionally, or failed to follow its own regulations, but they may not review agency action
where the challenge is only to the decision itself. (citing Elecs. of N.C., Inc. v. Se. Power
Admin., 774 F.2d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1985))).
94 Id.
95 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1908(e) (2012)).
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safeguard to governmental abuses. . . . In addition to the criminal and civil penalties that
[the] APPS authorizes the United States to seek, [the] APPS provides for compensation
for loss or damage as a result of unreasonable detention by the Coast Guard.96 Since
this after-the-fact remedy was available to Angelex, Angelexs desired injunctive re-
lief proved unauthorized.97
Reliance on the APPS seems entirely inappropriate in this case. As Judge Doumar
notes throughout his opinion, Angelex was in aprecarious financial position prior to the
Coast Guards detention of the Pappadakis. Keeping the Pappadakis at the dock in
Norfolk cost Angelex approximately $120,000 a month, or roughly $4,000 a day.98
The Pappadakis typically earned $12,000 a day for Angelex, and as Angelexs only
income-earning asset, Angelex had no discernible income.99 Judge Doumar also
noted that the Pappadakis was subject to a mortgage that totaled twice as much as
its present-day value.100 In fact, Judge Doumar noted that if Angelex auctioned off
the Pappadakis and recovered her fair market value (roughly $6.5 million), there
would still be no money left after payment of any penalties and satisfaction of out-
standing liens on the vessel.101 There, therefore, was no guarantee that there would
even be an Angelex at the end of the process to take advantage of the APPSs after-
the-fact remedies.
V. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Even in instances where the Court declines jurisdiction to review agency action,
the Court has allowed review of constitutional claims against agencies.102 In Webster
v. Doe, the plaintiff, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, alleged
that the Agency fired him for being a homosexual.103 The relevant statute committed
the decision to terminate employees of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligences discretion.104 The employee challenged the Agencys
96 Id. at 50809.
97 Id. at 509.
98 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, No. 2:13cv237, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at
*1415 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2013).
99 Id. at *1415.
100 Id.
101 Id. at *16.
102 Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L.REV. 689, 70102 (1990) (Courts rarely pronounce an action unreviewable without adding
that they would, nevertheless, entertain a challenge under limited circumstancesfor example,
if the action were alleged to be unconstitutional.).
103 486 U.S. 592, 59596 (1988).
104 Id. at 594 ([T]he Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the em-
ployment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States[.] (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c))).
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termination of his employment on a number of procedural grounds.105 The employee
also challenged his termination by the Director on constitutional grounds.106 Both
the district court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found both
the procedural and constitutional claims against the Central Intelligence Agency to
be reviewable.107
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that the Central Intelligence
Agencys actions were not reviewable on procedural grounds given that employment
decisions were statutorily committed to the Director of Central Intelligences discre-
tion.108 The Court then turned to the employees constitutional claims and stated that
it was confused as to exactly what those constitutional claims were.109 Despite not
understanding the precise nature of the employees constitutional claims, the Court
held that the constitutional claims were reviewable by the courts.110
In deciding that the employees constitutional claims were reviewable by the
courts, the Court relied on prior jurisprudence which held that where Congress intends
to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.111
The Court held this heightened showing[,] in part[,] . . . avoid[s] the serious constitu-
tional question that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial
105 Id. at 596 ([The employee] alleged that the Directors decision to terminate his em-
ployment violated the Administrative Procedure Act . . . because it was arbitraryand capricious,
represented an abuse of discretion, and was reached without observing the procedures re-
quired by law and CIA regulations.).
106 Id. ([The employee] also complained that the Directors termination of his employ-
ment deprived himof constitutionallyprotected rights to property, liberty, and privacy in vio-
lation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Finally, he asserted that his dismissal
transgressed the procedural due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment.).
107 Id. at 59798 (The [district] court determined that the APA provided judicial review
of [the Central Intelligence Agencys] termination decisions made under . . . the [National
Security Act] . . . . The Court of Appeals first decided that judicial review under the APA of
the Agencys decision to terminate [the employee] was not precluded by [the Administrative
Procedure Act].).
108 Id. at 601 (We thus find that the language and structure of [the National Security Act]
indicate that Congress meant to commit individual employee discharges to the Directors
discretion, and that [the Administrative Procedure Act] accordingly precludes judicial review
of these decisions under the APA. We reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that it found
such terminations reviewable by the courts.).
109 Id. at 602 (We share the confusion of the Court of Appeals as to the precise nature of
respondents constitutional claims. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain . . . whether
[the employee] contends that his termination, based on his homosexuality, is constitutionally
impermissible, or whether he asserts that a more pervasive discrimination policy exists in the
CIAs employment practices regarding all homosexuals.).
110 Id. at 60304 ([W]e believe that a constitutional claim based on an individual discharge
may be reviewed by the District Court.).
111 Id. at 603 (citing Johnson v.Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 37374 (1974)). The Court also cited
Weinberger v. Salfi as affirming its holding in Johnson. Id. (citing 422 U.S. 749 (1975)).
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forum for a colorable constitutional claim.112 As a result, the Court dismissed the
employees procedural claims, but remanded the employees constitutional claims.113
The Webster Court did not claim that the employees constitutional claims fur-
nished law to apply, but rather, the Court relied on a purely judicial intervention:
a superstrong presumption against preclusion of constitutional claims.114 Whatever
the Courts reasoning, the lower courts have followed Websters presumption in favor
of constitutional review of agency action.115
The Courts strong presumption towards judicial review of constitutional claims
regarding agency actions extends further than just review. In Mathews v. Eldridge,
the plaintiff claimed that his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were violated when
the Social SecurityAdministration cancelled his disability benefits without affording
him an evidentiary hearing.116 Instead of making his constitutional claim within the
Social Security Administrations administrative process, the plaintiff filed his challenge
in federal court.117 The Social Security Administration claimed that the courts could
not review the plaintiffs constitutional claims because the plaintiff had not exhausted
the administrative process.118 The Court, however, held that the plaintiff did not have
to exhaust the available administrative processes before bringing a constitutional claim
in federal court.119
112 Id. (quotingBowen v. Mich. Acad. of FamilyPhysicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
113 Id. at 605.
114 Levin, supra note 102, at 73031.
115 Id. (To date, however, the presumption invoked in [Webster v. Doe] has been virtually
an article of faith in the lower courts. (citing in support Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d
1469, 1471 (7th Cir. 1988); Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 10001 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Paluca v. Secy of Labor, 813 F.2d 524, 526 (1st Cir. 1987))).
116 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
117 Id. at 32425 (Instead of requesting reconsideration [the plaintiff] commenced this
action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing whether there exists a con-
tinuing disability.).
118 Id. at 325 (The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that [the plaintiff] . . . had
failed to exhaust available remedies.); see also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)
(Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing proce-
dures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.). The
rule of exhaustion typically requires that litigants exhaust all administrative review mecha-
nisms before initiating judicial review. See, e.g., Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331
U.S. 752, 767 (1947), cited in United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1,
9 (2008) (The doctrine, wherever applicable, does not require merely the initiation of prescribed
administrative procedures. It is one of exhausting them, that is, of pursuing them to their
appropriate conclusion and, correlatively, of awaiting their final outcome before seeking
judicial intervention.).
119 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 32930 (The fact that [the plaintiff] failed to raise with the Sec-
retary his constitutional claim to a pretermination hearing is not controlling. . . . It is unrealistic
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In Flemming v. Nestor, a deported immigrant lost his Social Security old-age
benefits as a result of his deportation.120 The immigrant challenged his loss of bene-
fits within the administrative appeals process, but he was unsuccessful in having his
benefits restored.121 Following the failure of his administrative appeal, the immigrant
challenged the loss of his benefits in federal court, alleging that the loss of his benefits
violated the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause by depriving him of an accrued
property right.122 Like in Mathews, the Social Security Administration claimed the im-
migrant needed to bring any constitutional challenge within the established adminis-
trative review process.123 The Court held that the federal courts held jurisdiction over
the immigrants constitutional claim even though he had previously brought a claim
within the administrative process.124
The Fourth Circuits own jurisprudence recognizes the Courts strong presump-
tion for the reviewability of constitutional claims over agency action. In Electricities
of North Carolina, Inc. v. Southeastern Power Administration, the Fourth Circuit
discussed in detail the presumption for review of agency action on constitutional
grounds.125 First, the Fourth Circuit cited to Justice Brennans concurrence in Heckler
v. Chaney: For example, an agency decision that violates a statutory or constitutional
command or is prompted by a bribe is not immune from judicial review even when
a lawful exercise of an agencys discretion has that immunity.126 The Fourth Circuit
then made reference in Electricities of North Carolina to its own jurisprudence and
the Fourth Circuits presumption that jurisdiction exists for federal courts to review
constitutional claims regarding agency action.127 Finally, in Electricities of North
to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current administrative
review system at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an adju-
dicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge.).
120 363 U.S. 603, 60506 (1960).
121 Id. at 606.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 60607 (The preliminary jurisdictional question is whether [the relevant statute
establishing a three judge panel for administrative review of such administrative action] is
applicable, and therefore required that the case be heard below before three judges, rather
than by a single judge, as it was.).
124 Id. at 60708 (Under the decisions of this Court, this . . . action could, and did, draw
in question constitutionality of [the relevant statute]. . . . We hold that jurisdiction over the
action was properly exercised by the District Court, and therefore reach the merits.).
125 774 F.2d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoted in Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d
500, 508 (4th Cir. 2013)).
126 Id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
127 Id. ([E]ven where action is committed to absolute agency discretion by law, courts have
assumedthepower to reviewallegations that anagencyexceeded its legalauthority, acteduncon-
stitutionally, or failed to follow its own regulations, but they may not review agency action
where the challenge is only to the decision itself. (quoting Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983, 988
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982))).
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Carolina, the Fourth Circuit cited to two decisions from sister circuits that also al-
lowed for judicial review of agency action on constitutional grounds.128
VI. ANGELEX AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
In its Angelex opinion, the Fourth Circuit block-quoted its own presumption of
constitutional review of agency action from Electricities of North Carolina.129 Despite
block-quoting its own strong presumption of constitutional reviewability, in the very
next sentence of its opinion, the Fourth Circuit denied Angelex any constitutional
review of the Coast Guards actions.130
In fact, the Fourth Circuit stated, on the same page its presumption of constitu-
tional reviewability: Angelexs attempt at turning this matter into a constitutional
challenge does not make the matter reviewable and thus, vest the district court with
jurisdiction.131 The Fourth Circuit based this radical departure from its prior block-
quoted jurisprudence on its belief that Angelexs constitutional claim was really a
thinly veiled attempt to get the Fourth Circuit to review the Coast Guards actions
on the merits of those actions.132 Because the Fourth Circuit believed that Angelexs
constitutional claim was really an end-run attempt to get the Fourth Circuit to review
the Coast Guards actions on the actions merits, it denied that there was even juris-
diction to hear the claim.133 Since the Coast Guard rigidly adhered to the require-
ments of the APPS in setting the Pappadakis proposed bond, jurisdiction did not
exist for a federal court to review the Coast Guards actions, even over a constitu-
tional claim.134
128 Id. (citing Ness Inv. Corp. v. U.S. Dept of Agric., 512 F.2d 706, 714 (9th Cir. 1975);
Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
129 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2013) (We are cognizant
of this courts declaration, [][E]ven where action is committed to absolute agency discretion by
law, courts have assumed the power to review allegations that an agency exceeded its legal
authority, acted unconstitutionally, or failed to follow its own regulations, but they may not
review agency action where the challenge is only to the decision itself.[] (quoting Elecs.
of N.C., 774 F.2d at 1267)).
130 Id. (Nonetheless, we disagree with [Angelexs] characterization of the Petition as an
attack on the statutory authority or constitutionality of the Coast Guards actions.).
131 Id.
132 Id. (Specifically, Angelex asserts that the government violated its due process rights by
indefinitely detaining the Pappadakis. This attempt at bypassing the reviewability exception in
[the Administrative Procedure Act] falls flat. As [the government] observed, Angelexs case is
nothing more than a direct review of the specific conditions sought by the Coast Guard in
order to allow departure.).
133 Id. ([W]e may not review agency action where the challenge is only to the decision
itself[.] (quoting Elecs. of N.C., 774 F.2d at 1267)).
134 Id. (In short, the Coast Guards stringent conformity to [the APPS] simply does not give
rise to a reviewable claim.).
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The Fourth Circuit dispatched Angelexs constitutional claim with a scant few
sentences. Such quick work of a claim that, by its own admission via its block-quoting
of Electricities of North Carolina in the Angelex opinion, would typically be granted
jurisdiction suggests that the Fourth Circuit did not view Angelexs constitutional
claim as one made with any seriousness. However, the briefs submitted to the Fourth
Circuit by both parties extensively discussed Angelexs constitutional claims. In its
brief in support of its appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the government noted that the courts
held jurisdiction to review whether the agency has violated its own regulations, or
the Constitution, or strayed so far beyond its statutory authority that its action is not
authorized by statute at all.135 However, the government contended that the Coast
Guards actions were not reviewable by federal courts because such actions were com-
mitted to agency discretion.136
In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, Angelex devoted significant argument to its con-
stitutional claims. Angelex argued that [t]he governments argument is that the end
justifies the means, and the Coast Guard should be permitted to exceed its statutory
authority.137 Angelex argued that [t]o give effect to the governments interpretation
of the statute is to impose a pre-judgment, non-recourse penalty on the vessel owner
and operator which is not countenanced by the Constitution, this statute, or any other
statute.138 Angelex next recounted the case law conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts to review agency action on constitutional grounds.139
In response to the governments argument that none of the jurisdictional grounds
for review of the Coast Guards actions existed, Angelex wrote that the governments
argument is simply incorrect, as the very purpose for Angelexs pursuit of judicial
interventionand a significant basis for the District Courts decisionwas the Coast
Guards actions beyond its statutory authority and its violation of Angelexs consti-
tutional due process rights.140 Angelex argued that its constitutional claim provided
a manageable standard for judicial review.141 Angelex continued, arguing that, in
135 Brief for the United States at 41, Angelex Ltd., 723 F.3d 500 (No. 13-1610).
136 Id. (None of these considerations applies in this action, which alleges that specific surety
conditions, proposed by the Coast Guard for the PAPPADAKIS, are unreasonable. Those
conditions, however, all relate to the ability of the United States to prosecute offenders and
secure the payment of fines, as well as provide for the well-being of the crewmembers. They
fall well within the scope of the statutory discretion Congress committed to the agency.).
137 Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 10, Angelex Ltd., 723 F.3d 500 (No. 13-1610).
138 Id. at 10 n.9.
139 Id. at 19, 32.
140 Id. at 3233.
141 Id. at 33 (However, as this Court has noted, it is well settled that even if agency action
is committed to its discretion by law, a court may still determine whether the action is consti-
tutional. . . . This is because the Due Process Clause provides a manageable standard for
review. (quoting Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2001))); see
Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1981). Angelex cited two other cases in support
of its argument that the Due Process Clause conferred manageable standards for the Fourth
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this matter, the indisputable existence of specific statutory construction issues, various
violations of its due process rights, and other constitutional concerns as a result of
the Coast Guards overreaching of its statutory authority, provide the District Court
(and this Court) with a manageable standard for review.142 Finally, Angelex argued
that the governments interpretation of the APPS meant that vessel owners would
have no place to bring a constitutional claim.143
In its brief in reply, the government again addressed Angelexs constitutional
claims in detail. First, the government argued that Angelexs claim that the govern-
ment was proposing a statutory interpretation precluding judicial review was mis-
placed.144 The government then reiterated its argument that Angelex was attempting
to get review on the merits of the agency action by making a constitutional claim.145
The government finally argued that Angelex did not properly plead its due process
claim.146 Despite that, the government argued again that Angelexs constitutional
claim was without merit.147
Not only did the parties argue the Angelexs constitutional claims in depth in their
briefs to the Fourth Circuit, but Judge Doumar similarly devoted much of his district
court opinion to the constitutional issues raised by the Coast Guards actions. First,
Judge Doumar held that the governments argument that the Coast Guards actions
were committed to absolute agency discretion were at odds with the Fourth Circuits
Circuit. Id. at 3334 (citing Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
142 Id. at 36.
143 Id. at 3738 ([T]he government is arguing, without citation to any authority, that once
Coast Guard Headquarters dictates the terms and conditions of the release of a vessel, there is
neither meaningful (i.e. non-futile) administrative appeals review, nor is there judicial review.
Under the governments interpretation, the Coast Guard would have unilateral and unreview-
able discretion to demand any terms and conditions, no matter how repugnant to due process
and the Constitution.).
144 Reply Brief for the United States at 8, Angelex Ltd., 723 F.3d 500 (No. 13-1610)
(Angelex instead attempts to invoke the principle that even actions committed to the agencys
discretion may be reviewed if they are far outside the scope of the agencys statutory
authority, or are unconstitutional. But while this exception makes clear that Angelexs hypo-
thetical situations of a supposed logical extreme would not necessarily be immune from
judicial review, that exception plainly is inapplicable here. (citations omitted)).
145 Id. (Notwithstanding the lofty principles Angelex seeks to invoke, this case is nothing
more than a direct review of the specific conditions sought by the Coast Guard in order to
allow departureand the district courts decision to usurp the Coast Guards authority with
a new set of departure conditions imposed by the court.).
146 Id. at 9 (Finally, Angelexs attempt to hinge a right to review on a supposed due process
argument overlooks the fact that Angelex did not assert a due process claim in its petition for
review in the district court.).
147 Id. (In any event, the argument is meritless; among other things, a Coast Guard offer
of security conditions, which is entirely discretionary, cannot create a property right entitled
to due process protection.).
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jurisprudence.148 As a result, Judge Doumar held that the district court possessed juris-
diction to review the Coast Guards actions.149
In the district court decision, Judge Doumar held that the Coast Guard abused its
discretion under the APPS in a number of ways.150 As part of the district courts
analysis of the Coast Guards abuse of its discretion, Judge Doumar also ruled on the
constitutionality of the Coast Guards actions.151 Judge Doumar held that [t]he
record before the Court includes persuasive evidence that a $2.5 million bondor
fine for that matteris simply beyond the financial wherewithal of the petitioners,
and that the continued detention of the vessel by withholding its departure clearance
will rapidly bankrupt the vessels owner.152 Judge Doumar held that the ability of
the Coast Guard to put Angelex out of business without any review of the Coast
Guards action clearly violated the Constitution.153 Judge Doumar went so far as to
hold that [i]n more than thirty years on the bench, this Court can recall seeing no
greater disregard for due process, nor any more egregious abdication of the reason-
able exercise of discretion.154 As a result, the district court ordered the release of the
Pappadakis following Angelexs posting of appropriate security.155
148 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, No. 2:13cv237, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846, at *1718
(E.D. Va. May 8, 2013) ([T]his holding appears to be at odds with Fourth Circuit precedent,
which holds to the contrary that, even if a statute confers absolute discretion upon an agency,
the federal courts retain jurisdiction to review discretionary agency actions for abuse of discre-
tion. (citing Elecs. of N.C., Inc. v. Se. Power Admin., 744 F.2d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1985);
Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th Cir. 1971); Shipbuilders Council of Am., Inc. v.
U. S. Dept of Homeland Sec., 673 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (E.D. Va. 2009))).
149 Id. at *18 (Thus, [the APA] does not provide a jurisdictional bar to review in this case.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction under the APA.).
150 Id. at *2425 (In this case, the Coast Guard seeks to impose several conditions designed
not to assure payment of any fines or civil penalties, but to facilitate the prosecution of criminal
or civil proceedings against the petitioners. In so doing, the Coast Guard has exceeded its legal
authority and abused its discretion. Moreover, in refusing to set a reasonable bond amount,
insisting that no less than a $2.5 million bond is satisfactory to assure the payment of potential
fines and civil penalties in this case, the Coast Guard has also abused its discretion.).
151 Id. at *2627.
152 Id. at *26.
153 Id. at *27 (The idea that by imposition of an unreasonable bond demand, the Coast Guard
might accomplish what it cannot do through prosecution of the underlying criminal offensethe
extinguishment ofa lawful business, to the detriment of itsprincipals, itsemployees, its creditors,
and its customers, but to the advantage of no onewithout due process is simply repugnant to
the Constitution.).
154 Id.
155 Id. at *28 (For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction,
that the Coast Guard abused its discretion in demanding a $2.5 million bond as a condition
for granting departure clearance to the Pappadakis and in demanding the imposition of addi-
tional non-monetaryconditions unrelated to assuringpayment ofanyfines or civilpenalties, and
that [the vessel owners] have an absolute right to release of the vessel upon posting of ade-
quate security.).
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VII. THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN ANGELEX
The Fourth Circuits decision in Angelex to deny subject matter jurisdiction over
a claim for constitutional review of agency action is in stark contrast with the Supreme
Courts strong presumption in Webster and other cases. In Webster, the Court admitted
to not even knowing the exact nature of the complaining employees constitutional
claim.156 The Court also held in Webster that all of the employees procedural griev-
ances were unreviewable since they were committed to agency discretion.157 Even
still, despite dismissing all of the employees other claims, and after admitting that
the Court did not even understand the nature of the employees constitutional claim,
the Court still held that federal courts possessed jurisdiction to review the employees
claims.158 Cases like Mathews and Flemming further underscore the Courts strong
presumption that constitutional claims against agency action have jurisdiction.159
Unlike Webster, Angelexs constitutional claim should not have been a mystery to
the Fourth Circuit. Both parties briefed the constitutional issue extensively for the
Fourth Circuit.160 Not only was the Fourth Circuit briefed on the issue by both litigants,
but the district court devoted a significant portion of its opinion to the constitutional
claim against the Coast Guard.161 While Judge Doumar discussed the constitutional
claim in terms of it being an abuse of discretion, the lower court invoked due process
violations as one of the grounds for the courts finding that the Coast Guard abused
its discretion.162
Despite having a clearer idea of what exactly the constitutional claim was than the
Supreme Court had in Webster, the Fourth Circuit still denied jurisdiction for a federal
court to review Angelexs constitutional claim.163 Such a holding seems incompati-
ble with Webster, the Fourth Circuits own jurisprudence in cases like Electricities
of North Carolina, and the virtual[ ] . . . article of faith that lower courts have in
holding that constitutional claims over agency action are reviewable by the courts.164
The Fourth Circuits decision to deny jurisdiction entirely is even more con-
founding when one considers the procedural outs available to the Fourth Circuit if
the court was set on dismissing Angelexs claim. The government, in its briefs, first
alleged that Angelex did not comply with the requirements of the APPS in bringing
a claim for judicial review of the Coast Guards actions.165 Second, the Coast Guard
156 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602 (1988).
157 Id. at 601.
158 Id. at 603.
159 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
608 (1960).
160 See supra notes 13547 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 14855 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 15055 and accompanying text.
163 Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 2013).
164 Levin, supra note 102, at 73031.
165 Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 2627.
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alleged that Angelex did not properly plead a constitutional cause of action in its initial
Emergency Order.166 Both claims seem to have at least some merit to them, and yet,
the Fourth Circuit made no mention of either theory in its opinion.167 Instead of dismiss-
ing Angelexs complaint on procedural grounds, the Fourth Circuit went further and
held that Angelex simply could not bring a constitutional claim for review of the Coast
Guards actions.
What is most troubling about the Fourth Circuits opinion, however, is that the
circuit effectivelybarred Angelex, oranysimilarlysituated vessel owner, from ever get-
ting constitutional review of the Coast Guards actions in a magic pipe or APPS case.
The Coast Guard afforded Angelex no formal administrative reviewprocess.168 Instead,
the Coast Guard put its foot down at $2.5 million and refused to budge.169 The Fourth
Circuit, then in turn, said the federal courts did not even have jurisdiction to entertain
such a claim from a vessel owner.170 Where, then, could a vessel owner like Angelex
ever bring a constitutional claim? Not in an administrative proceeding. Not in a fed-
eral court.
The Fourth Circuit seemed to answer this charge by claiming that Angelex could
bring a civil action, at the end of all the proceedings against it and the vessel, to
recover damages if the Coast Guard ended up being wrong.171 However, the Fourth
Circuit did not discuss the major concern of the district court: giving the Coast Guard
unchecked discretion very likely meant there would be no Angelex remaining to
take advantage of such a remedy.172 With no place to bring its constitutional claim,
166 Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 144, at 9.
167 See generally Angelex, 723 F.3d 500.
168 Id. at 502.
169 Id. Even if the Coast Guard had provided Angelex with an internal administrative review
process, the Supreme Courts jurisprudence makes it clear that an administrative proceeding
would be an inappropriate forum for a claim for constitutional review of agency action. An
administrative review process does exist for APPS claims, though the Coast Guards take-it-
or-leave-it posturing makes it unclear whether that process was available to Angelex. See
generally Watervale Marine Co. v. U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., No. 12-cv-0105, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97819, at *16 (D.D.C. July 18, 2014) (The Coast Guards administrative ap-
peal process has four stages: (1) a request for consideration at the Coast Guard Sector level;
(2) appeal to the District Commander; (3) appeal to the Area Commander; and (4) appeal to
the Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Prevention.).
170 Angelex, 723 F.3d at 503.
171 Id. at 50809 (Finally, APPS contains a built-insafeguard togovernmental abuses, which
further convinces us that Angelexs Petition is out of place and time. In addition to the criminal
and civil penalties that APPS authorizes the United States to seek, APPS provides for compen-
sation for loss or damage as a result of unreasonable detention by the Coast Guard. . . . This
provision is, as the government asserts, an after-the-fact damages remedy against the United
States for unreasonable detention or delay. This safeguard gives [Angelex] a remedy, distinct
from the unauthorized injunctive relief they now seek. (citation omitted)).
172 AngelexLtd. v. United States, No. 2:13cv237, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS65846, at*16(E.D.
Va. May 8, 2013) (Fourth, any administrative remedies would be inadequate. By the time an
administrative appeal is resolved, Angelex would be out of business, its employees out of work,
876 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:857
there remained a very real possibility that the Coast Guards actions could destroy
Angelex, and there would be absolutely no review of such actions.
VIII. A DEVELOPING COURT SPLIT
Two other cases have dealt with due process claims regarding Coast Guard action
under the APPS. The court in Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. v. United States en-
countered facts very similar to the facts encountered by the courts in Angelex.173 In
Bottiglieri, the Coast Guard boarded and inspected a foreign-flagged and foreign-
owned cargo vessel at the Port of Mobile, Alabama.174 Having conducted interviews
with the vessels master and crew, the Coast Guard concluded the vessels crew had
employed a magic pipe.175 Like in Angelex, the Coast Guard requested that Customs
and Border Patrol put a hold on the vessel.176 Once Customs and Border Patrol put
a hold on the vessel, the Coast Guard and the vessels owner negotiated over a bond
for the vessels release, but the parties were unable to come to an agreement on the
bond amount or on other non-monetary terms.177 Following the parties inability to
come to an agreement on the Coast Guards bond conditions, the vessel owner filed
an emergency action in the district court for a judicial resolution of the stalemate be-
tween the Coast Guard and the vessel owner.178 The vessel owners action included
procedural claims and a claim that the Coast Guard [was] violating the Constitution
and its creditors, including the United States, unable to obtain full satisfaction.); see also id. at
*1415 (Angelex has only one income-producing asset, the Pappadakis, burdened by a mort-
gage that exceeds its present value by nearly double. In a tough economy for shipping, the com-
pany has been surviving in recent years on a narrow margin. With the Pappadakis idle, the
vessel produces no income . . . and Angelex continues to expend approximately $120,000
per month (about $4,000 per day) just to maintain the vessels crew. With thin margins and
an overwhelming debt load, the extensive delay inherent in the Coast Guards administrative
appeals process likely would be a death knell for this company.).
173 843 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1243 (S.D. Ala. 2012).
174 Id.
175 Id. ([The Coast Guard] interviewed the ships master and crew members concerning
possible violations of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships. . . . During those interviews,
Coast Guard officials were allegedly informed that the Vessel was equipped with a magic pipe
for the unlawful discharge of machinery space waste, and that [the] chief engineer . . . had di-
rected the crew on at least six occasions since December 2011 to utilize the magic pipe to
discharge such waste directly into the sea, without first passing it through required pollution
prevention equipment.).
176 Id. at 1244.
177 Id. ([T]he parties disagreed as to the amount of the bond itself, with the Owner offering
$500,000 and the Coast Guard demanding $750,000 . . . . [Later], the Coast Guard reduced its
bond demand to $700,000, which the Owner promptly rejected as a non-starter. Second, the
parties could not reach an accord on provisions for the eight crew members whose presence
in Mobile the Coast Guard requires as its APPS investigation proceeds. (citations omitted)).
178 Id. at 1242.
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by requiring a waiver of rights and defenses and infring[ing] upon the rights and
liberties of foreign seafarers.179
The district court first dismissed the vessel owners procedural claims as l[ying]
outside the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act, inasmuch as the Coast Guards
actions are committed to agency discretion by law.180 The district court then turned
to the vessel owners constitutional claims.181 Despite ultimately holding that jurisdic-
tion did not exist to review the Coast Guards action,182 the district court seemed to
review the vessel owners constitutional claim on its merits.183 The district court also
held that the vessel owners due process rights had not been violated by the Coast
Guard since the vessel owner had not availed itself of the administrative review pro-
cess.184 According to the district court, since the vessel owners declined to bring their
procedural grievances within the administrative process, the vessel owners due
process rights had not been abridged, though the court couched this holding in terms
of denying jurisdiction.185
In Wilmina Shipping AS v. United States Department of Homeland Security, the
Coast Guard conducted an inspection of a Norwegian-flagged vessel while the vessel
was docked in Corpus Christi, Texas.186 While aboard the vessel, the Coast Guard
found certain of the ships pollution control devices to be inoperable or disarmed in
violation of U.S. laws and international treaties.187 Instead of putting a customs hold
179 Id. at 1250 n.16 (second alteration in original).
180 Id. at 1249 (There is no law to apply and no meaningful standard against which to judge
the Coast Guards exercise of its discretion . . . in setting terms for a surety agreement under
which customs clearance would be granted to the Vessel; therefore, that decision is not subject
to judicial review under the APA, and the APA cannot provide a jurisdictional basis for the
Emergency Motion and Petition.).
181 Id. at 1250.
182 Id. at 1253.
183 Id. at 1250 ([P]etitioners argue that the District Court is empowered to act to prevent a
manifest injustice or the abridgment of Petitioners due process rights. There is no indication
of manifest injustice here. The Coast Guard and the Owner have attempted to negotiate a surety
agreement. The Owner has declined the Coast Guards final offer, although it could decide
otherwise if it chooses. (citation omitted)).
184 Id. (Petitioners enjoy a due process right to seek reconsideration or bring an adminis-
trative appeal of the Coast Guards decision concerning suretyagreement terms, and to potential
judicial review (at a minimum, in the form of an action for damages arising from unreason-
able detention or delay of the Vessel). To date, however, they have attempted to circumvent
these procedures by filing a lawsuit targeted outside the APPS administrative and judicial
review scheme.).
185 Id.
186 934 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013).
187 Id.; see also id. at 4 (The deficiencies cited in the report included the facts that: the
ships oily water separator . . . was inoperable; a discharge pipe, which was supposed to run be-
tween the oily water separator and through the ships hull, had been removed; and parts of
the oily water separator were found in a chemical locker. . . . Finally, [the Coast Guard] found
that the ship failed to maintain proper records in its oil record book.).
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on the vessel like in Angelex and Giuseppe Bottiglieri, the Coast Guard revoked the
paperwork necessary for the vessel to operate in United States waters and ordered that
the vessel could not enter United States waters for three years or until it came up with
an environmental plan and passed a years worth of audits.188 The Coast Guard pos-
sessed the ability to ban the vessel from United States waters under the APPS.189
As a result of the Coast Guards actions, the vessel owners alleged that the Coast
Guard lacked the authority to act as it did and that the Coast Guard did not provide
the vessel owners with due process.190 The district court held that the Coast Guard had
the statutoryauthorityunder the APPS to exclude the vessel from United States waters,
but that the Coast Guard erred in not providing the vessel owners a path for reinstate-
ment within the first three years.191
The district court then turned to the vessel owners constitutional claims and judged
them on their merits, implying that the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
claims in the first place.192 On the merits, the district court held that [t]o prevail on
their due process claim, [the vessel owners] must demonstrate that they possessed a
constitutionallyprotected property or liberty interest and that theywere deprived of that
interest without sufficient legal process.193 The district court held that the vessel own-
ers possessed the requisite property interest,194 but that the vessel owners were not
entitled to a hearing before the Coast Guard revoked the vessels certificate because
the vessel owners could have appealed the decision within the Coast Guard.195 Since the
vessel owners had not availed themselves of the appeals process, the district court held
that the vessel owners due process rights had not been violated by the Coast Guard.196
Three federal courts have dealt with due process claims relating to the Coast
Guards magic pipe enforcement under the APPS.197 Those three courts have
188 Id. at 2.
189 Id. at 9.
190 Id. at 2.
191 Id. at 20 ([T]he Court rules that the Coast Guard had the authority to revoke the [vessels]
certificateand to imposeas conditions for its reissuance thesubmission ofa satisfactoryenviron-
mental plan and a year of successful audits. But it did not have the authority to ban the ship
from entering U.S. waters for a term of three years, and that term of the Order is hereby de-
clared invalid.).
192 Id. at 1520. The district court did not analyze whether it held jurisdiction to review the
constitutional claim.
193 Id. at 15.
194 Id. at 17 ([T]he Court holds that [the vessel owners] have a constitutionally protected
property interest in the [vessels] certificate of service . . . .).
195 Id. at 1719 (All that is required before the deprivation of a protected interest is notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. . . . The Coast Guards
appeals process provides opportunity for reconsideration of an order, two levels of further
appeal within the agency with the opportunity for plaintiffs to provide documentation and evi-
dence as well as rebuttal materials, and a final appeal decided on the record.).
196 Id. at 3.
197 See Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 2013); Wilmina Shipping, 934
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inconsistently held that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear such claims in the first
place.198 The Fourth Circuit in Angelex held that the courts did not have jurisdiction
to entertain a constitutional challenge of the Coast Guards actions under the APPS.199
The district court in Giuseppe Bottiglieri held that it also did not possess jurisdiction,
but actually seemed to evaluate the vessel owners constitutional claim on the merits.200
Finally, the district court in Wilmina Shipping adjudicated the vessel owners constitu-
tional claim on the merits without devoting any discussion to its jurisdiction to engage
in such an analysis.201
A fourth court, in dicta, suggested that the Angelex court was mistaken in its refusal
to grant subject matter jurisdiction to Angelexs constitutional claims.202 In Watervale
Marine Co. v. United States Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard placed
customs holds on multiple vessels owned by the plaintiffs for unspecified violations
of the APPS.203 Unlike Angelex and other vessel owners in the aforementioned cases,
the vessel owners in Watervale Marine Co. paid the bond requested bythe Coast Guard
and agreed to the required security agreements.204 Following the release of the vessels,
the owners then challenged the Coast Guards bond requirements through the Coast
Guards administrative review process and then the owners brought an action in the
district court alleging, among other claims, that the Coast Guard abused its discretion
under the APPS and that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously.205
The district court ultimately concluded that the Coast Guards actions were pro-
cedurally unreviewable by the court.206 However, the court noted that, even when it
could not review the Coast Guards actions procedurally, it could still review Coast
Guard action for constitutional violations: [T]here is nothing to prevent a court
from considering constitutional challenges to the Coast Guards departure clearance
demands.207 The court continued, holding that judicial review of a constitutional
F. Supp. 2d 1; Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (S.D.
Ala. 2012).
198 Angelex, 723 F.3d at 502 (no jurisdiction); Wilmina Shipping, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1 (did not
rule on a jurisdiction issue); Giuseppe Bottiglieri, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1241(no jurisdiction but eval-
uated constitutional claims).
199 Angelex, 723 F.3d at 502.
200 Giuseppe Bottiglieri, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 124950.
201 Wilmina Shipping, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
202 Watervale Marine Co. v. U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., No. 12-cv-0105, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97819, at *3941 (D.D.C. July 18, 2014).
203 Id. at *4.
204 Id. at *15.
205 Id. at *1519.
206 Id. at *7172 ([The] statute makes clear that the Coast Guard may release the vessel
upon the posting of such abond, and does not provide anystandards for this Court to applywhen
evaluating the Coast Guards decision not to grant departure clearance even if a bond is posted
without satisfaction of other conditions.).
207 Id. at *67 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 60304 (1988)).
880 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:857
due process claim that challenges unconscionable clearance conditions as wholly
unconscionable would prevent absurd results.208 The court concluded, holding that
the availability of constitutional review of the Coast Guards actions provided a neces-
sary check on overreaching by the Coast Guard.209 If anything, the court seemed miffed
as to why the plaintiffs in Watervale Marine Co. did not bring a constitutional claim.210
A court split across multiple federal districts and circuits is especially troubling
in the area of international shipping. In Angelex, Giuseppe Bottiglieri, and Wilmina
Shipping, the vessels were foreign-flagged and held by foreign corporations.211 Incon-
sistent rulings depending on the jurisdiction a vessel is in would make it tough for
foreign corporations to effectively assert their rights. Complicating this is the fact
that vessels often make multiple ports-of-call in the United States, and depending on
where the Coast Guard decides to enforce the APPS determines whether the shipping
companies have jurisdiction to bring a constitutional claim.212
IX. THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN MAGIC PIPE CASES
The need for courts to find jurisdiction for constitutional claims in magic pipe
cases is amplified by two other factors: the Coast Guards zeal to institute actions under
the APPS on very little evidence and the possible payday available to magic pipe
whistle-blowers. In recent years, the Coast Guard has dramatically increased its en-
forcement of regulationsagainst foreign-flagged vessels.213 This increased enforcement
by the Coast Guard has led to a rash of vessel and crew detentions, as well as crim-
inal allegations and charges against vessel owners, operators, managers, officers, and
208 Id. at *6768 (citing Estate of Phillips v. District of Columbia, 455 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)).
209 Id. at *68 (Thus, a finding that this Court can review Plaintiffs APA claim is not neces-
sary in order to avoid the agency overreach that the Plaintiffs fear.). The Watervale Marine
Co. Court, therefore, held it proper for a vessel owner to use constitutional review in the exact
way Angelex attempted to use constitutional review.
210 Id. at *68 n.16 (noting that while the plaintiffs complaint alleged a constitutional vio-
lation by the Coast Guard, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim directly under any constitu-
tional provision).
211 See Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 2013); Wilmina Shipping
Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013); Giuseppe Bottiglieri
Shipping Co. v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1243 (S.D. Ala. 2012).
212 Compare Angelex, 723 F.3d at 502 (stating there was no jurisdiction to bring claim in
Fourth Circuit), with Wilmina Shipping, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (stating there was jurisdiction to
evaluate claim in the District of Columbia).
213 Parrish et al., supra note 63, at 1009 (The United States has become increasingly aggres-
sive in pursuing violators of APPS, especially as it relates to the bypassing of a vessels oily
water separator. . . .); see also id. (As a result of aggressive federal enforcement, as well as
heightened security after the events of September 11, 2001 . . . [there] has been a significant in-
crease in the scrutinywithwhich vessels and the vessels records and logs are being inspected.).
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crews.214 The Coast Guard has almost exclusively enforced the APPS against for-
eign corporations.215
Not only has the Coast Guard increased its enforcement of the APPS with regard
to magic pipes, but it has often done so with scant evidence.216 Due to the zealous-
ness of prosecutors and the steadily increasing weight of criminal penalties, some
within the maritime industry have categorized DOJ prosecutions . . . as a witch-
hunt.217 This has led the Department of Justice to currently average[ ] approxi-
mately two to four new vessel pollution cases per month.218
The increase in the number of APPS cases also results from the potential payday
the law affords whistle-blowers. Under the current scheme, crew members who blow
the whistle on their vessels APPS violations may be awarded up to half of any criminal
fine paid by the vessel owner.219 Rewards for whistle-blowers under the APPS can be
substantial. For instance, in United States v. Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., the dis-
trict court awarded $437,500 to each of the twelve whistle-blowers involved in an
APPS case.220 In reviewing the district courts ruling, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit also awarded a total sum of $50,000 in attorneys fees to two of the whistle-
blowers.221 As a result of the large potential payday available to magic pipe whistle-
blowers, [a]pproximately one-third of new vessel pollution prosecutions brought by
the Department of Justice are now initiated by crew members recounting illegal dis-
charge activity to port authorities.222 The possible rewards available to whistle-
blowers under the APPS have been well publicized within the maritime community.223
Given the potentially huge paydays awaiting APPS whistle-blowers, fact finders
have grown increasingly skeptical of magic pipe claims made by crew members. In
214 Id. at 100910.
215 Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1826
(2011) (APPS cases typically have been brought against foreign ship owners. Only two out of
forty-three of the APPS convictions located involved domestic firms and the forty-one others
were foreign. After all, few commercial shipping concerns flag or register their vessels in the
United States.).
216 Parrish et al., supra note 63, at 1010 ([E]ven when pollution is not discovered, the Coast
Guard and federal prosecutors, upon the mere discovery of a flexible hose or other suspicious
looking equipment in the engine room, may well commence a grand jury investigation seeking
to prosecute an alleged illegal bypassing of the [oily water separator] system and/or the pre-
sentation of an oil record book containing false entries.).
217 Homer, supra note 77, at 156.
218 Garrett, supra note 215, at 1827.
219 33 C.F.R. § 151.04(c) (2013) (In the discretion of the Court, an amount equal to not more
than one-half of the fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to conviction.).
220 625 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010).
221 Id. at 15.
222 James D. Oesterle, Citizen Rewards to Promote Environmental Crimes Prosecu-
tions, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 46, 46 (2009).
223 Id. at 48 (Seafarers unions and trade publications have reported on past cases and
informed their members of the prospect for rewards.).
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the criminal trial of an engineer accused of employing a magic pipe on his vessel,
the district court found that at least one of the whistle-blowers was motivated by the
possible reward and made false statements as a result.224 The engineer was acquitted
by the court on all three felony charges.225 Other courts have similarly found whistle-
blowers incredible.226
Combined with the Coast Guards eagerness to institute APPS proceedings at
the drop of a hat and the personal motivations for whistle-blowers to bring suspect
claims, the Fourth Circuits denial of jurisdiction in Angelex creates a perfect storm
for vessel owners going forward. As in Angelex, the vessel owner may be forced to
pay thousands of dollars after the Coast Guard places a hold on the companys vessel
based on little evidence, or worse, fabricated evidence by a whistle-blower, and the
vessel owner has no forum to challenge the action. The Coast Guard, in Angelex,
made it incredibly clear it was unwilling to negotiate on the bond amount to release
the Pappadakis, and the Fourth Circuit denied that a constitutional claim could even
be brought to challenge the action. Vessel owners are therefore left without a forum
to contest even frivolous actions. While the vessel owner in Angelex ultimately stayed
in business, given the seeming inability for a vessel owner to bring a claim anywhere,
it appears a distinct possibility that the Coast Guard has absolute free reign to bank-
rupt a company absent any judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION
The final result in the Angelex litigation drives home the dangers of refusing to
grant vessel owners jurisdiction for constitutional challenges to the Coast Guards
actions in magic pipe cases. The criminal trial related to the Pappadakis alleged
magic pipe concluded on September 13, 2013.227 After two full days of deliberations,
the jury returned a verdict finding both the Pappadakis owner and operator not
224 See Appellants Brief at 3637, United States v. Taohim, No. 12-14316 (11th Cir.
July 30, 2013), 2012 WL 5457601 (describing United States v. Georgakondis, 2:07-cr
-00024-DLJ-2 (E.D. Cal. 2007), a case where the judge found at least one whistle-blower to
be untrustworthy and noting how such a reward was a motivation to lie).
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., Greek Chief Engineer Acquitted in Texas Magic Pipe Pollution Trial, MARI-
TIME EXECUTIVE (May 6, 2010), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2010-5-6-greek
-chief-engineer-acquitted-texas-magic-pipe-pollution-trial/ (Council [sic] for [the charged
chief engineer of a vessel] demonstrated the crew misled the government about the chief en-
gineers involvement in return for grants of immunity. The jury found the crew members
were not credible.).
227 Robert McCabe, Engineer Guilty in Dumping; Coal Ship May Soon Depart, THE
VIRGINIAPILOT (Sept. 14, 2013), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/09/engineer-guilty-dumping
-coal-ship-may-soon-depart.
2015] REVIEWING THE MAGIC PIPES 883
guilty on all charges.228 The Pappadakis chief engineer, however, was convicted of
seven charges, but was acquitted of a charge of conspiracy.229 The court released the
chief engineer on bond until his sentencing.230 On October 2, 2013, the Pappadakis
finally left Portsmouth.231
While the result of the criminal trial undoubtedly led to some nervous times for
the Pappadakis former chief engineer, the vessel ultimately left Hampton Roads with-
out having to pay any fines related to the magic pipe on board.232 Yet, the months of
litigation hardly seem to justify the result. The Pappadakis was not allowed to leave
without posting millions of dollars in bond, but her chief engineer, the only person
who was found guilty of any wrongdoing, was immediately released on bond upon
his conviction.233
The Supreme Court created a strong presumption of judicial review of agency
action over constitutional claims. Despite that longstanding presumption, the Fourth
Circuit in Angelex refused to even grant jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge
to the Coast Guards actions. At no point was the Coast Guard required to demonstrate
to a court whyits effective detention of the Pappadakis was necessary. And, ultimately,
a jury held the detention was not warranted. Had the Fourth Circuit simply exercised
the jurisdiction over Angelexs constitutional claim, much of that unnecessary expense
could have been spared.
228 Id. (A jury in a federal criminal trial found two corporate defendants, the owner and
operator of the Maltese-flag vessel Antonis G. Pappadakis, not guilty Friday on eight charges
related to the dumping of oily wastewater at sea and the failure to keep an accurate account of
the ships oil discharges.).
229 Id. (The chief engineer on the ship, however, was convicted on seven of the eight
charges, including falsification of records and obstruction of justice. He was acquitted of a
conspiracy charge.).
230 Id. (Lambros Katsipis, 59, of Greece was released on bond and will be sentenced
Dec. 16. He faces up to three years in prison.).
231 Detained Coal Ship Departs Portsmouth After Trial, WVEC.com (Oct. 3, 2013,
6:00 AM), http://www.13newsnow.com/story/news/2014/09/10/14831388.
232 See McCabe, supra note 227.
233 Id.

